

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Save the Children Netherlands (SCNL), through Save the Children Philippines, carried out for 21 months (one year and 9 months) an emergency and early recovery humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan affected communities in Panay Island or Western Visayas. The interventions were implemented in the provinces of Iloilo and Capiz, with the bulk going to the municipality of Carles, Iloilo. The program is funded by SHO (Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies).

SHO-SCNL's Typhoon Haiyan's program was undertaken in two phases—phase 1 focused on emergency and early recovery and phase 2 focused on recovery. The first phase of the SHO funded intervention consists of providing shelter and non-food items and also providing direct conditional cash transfers to replace boats and other fishing inputs. The second phase of the SHO funded intervention has three components: food security and livelihood (FSL); education; and, water, sanitation and health (WASH).

The FSL component consisted of providing resources to a thousand vulnerable households in the fishing communities, including non-boat owning households, geared at recovering their livelihood and/or starting an alternative livelihood. It also provided support to fishing associations to aid in coral recovery, and to small-scale traders for market recovery. The education program includes activities aimed at resuming learning and school activities. Moreover, the education component includes institutional and capacity building support to the education cluster. The WASH activities consist of repair or construction of WASH facilities in seven schools and provision of latrines to more than a thousand vulnerable households.

The program has ended in June 2015 and this final external evaluation is needed for accountability and learning. Based on the DAC criteria, the external evaluation study focused on effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability. It also looked at coherence, coverage and participation. The evaluation study used both quantitative (household survey) and qualitative methods (FGDs, interviews, observation). It was carried out for thirty working days by a team composed of three consultants in close cooperation with Save the Children Panay Program Office.

Summary of Findings:

Both SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions were effective in achieving their respective outputs despite being implemented in the context of a category 5 storm destruction and in different phases of emergency humanitarian response. Most components of the SHO-funded programs have even exceeded the target number of people who benefitted from the interventions. This evaluation also confirms that all the different

activities under multiple components of the SHO-funded intervention were implemented as planned, except for debris clean-up component in the SHO 2 education program and the support for small market traders in the SHO 2 FSL program.

Cleaning-up of the typhoon debris was no longer needed at the time of the project implementation while the support for small market traders was carried out under a different grant. In terms of achieving the outcomes, this evaluation study finds that the SHO programs had saved lives and some components contributed to safer and better recovery as discussed below:

Effectiveness of SHO 1:

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The completeness of the shelter and NFI kit and the fact that these were used by the beneficiaries means that this component has achieved its objectives of providing relief. However, the SHO 1 program was not implemented as designed (i.e. support for livelihood/boat repair should complement the provision of shelter and NFI kits).

Only about a third of the beneficiary households received both shelter kit/NFI and boat repair support. Moreover, this evaluation study finds that the aim to increase food security from a resumed livelihood seems ambitious for the amount of cash transfer given and the seasonal effects of the fishing livelihood. The amount of the cash transfer was not enough to repair or build a boat (to the point of beneficiaries becoming indebted to supply the additional funding needed), thus it is not reasonable to expect that their incomes from resuming livelihood activities would be sufficient to ensure food security, much less shelter repair.

Effectiveness of SHO 2-Education:

The SHO-funded education intervention was effective in providing relief to parents, children and teachers and also in recovering the infrastructure and capacity of schools and teachers to provide quality learning environment for children. The infrastructure development (repairs and construction) has resulted in safer and more conducive learning space for the teachers and school children. It has no effect on the children's access to schools and school attendance. The construction of WASH facilities facilitated access to water in schools and a healthier learning environment. The teacher's and student's kits provided the teachers and parents economic relief and it also helped encourage children to go to school. A large majority of parents confirmed that their children received the school kit. The distribution process of teacher's and student's kits is found to be effective and orderly. However, selective distribution of the WASH kit has unintentionally left the excluded children heavy-hearted and disappointed. This has also created undue burden to school heads and teachers. Inconsistency in the contents and quality of the teacher's kits (possibly from various SCI grants) has also unintentionally created comparisons and discontent among the teachers of different schools. This should prompt SCI to be more careful and sensitive to the subculture of public school teachers when managing similar type of intervention under different grants.

The capacity building activities for teachers are found to be effective in not only increasing knowledge on dealing with school children but also in dealing with their own well-being. However, the psychosocial training would have been more effective had there been practical exercises and skills transfer. Likewise, the teachers said that the SHO-funded training intervention would have been more valuable had it included the DRR training for teachers.

Effectiveness of SHO 2- FSL:

The FSL component consisted of three components; livelihood provision (UCT and CCT), livelihood protection (UCT and CCT), and livelihood promotion (CG).

This evaluation finds that the UCT intervention successfully provided the means for households to provide food and other essential needs (livelihood provisioning). It was also successful in protecting livelihood, by enabling over a third (36%) of the households who received only the UCT to conduct income-generating activities using this cash transfer. As measured by their income status as compared to before Haiyan, the UCT was effective in contributing to livelihood provision for those that have reported the same income as pre-Haiyan and livelihood protection for those that have reported increase in income compared to pre-Haiyan. Overall, it contributed to livelihood recovery of 65% of all UCT recipient respondents (i.e. those who reported having same and increased incomes).

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This evaluation finds that the CCT intervention successfully enabled a large majority (88.64%) of the beneficiaries to replace their productive assets enough to resume livelihood. The evaluation survey result also reveals that not all of the CCT beneficiaries used the cash transfer for livelihood. Those who did not use it for livelihood (11.36%) used it mostly for food, an indicator of prevailing food insecurity in the target

communities. The survey results further show that respondents also used the cash grant for non-food items. The use of the CCT for items other than livelihood may be reflective of the cash flow management system/practice of the recipient households. This cash management practice allowed the beneficiaries to provide for their most immediate needs without sacrificing their livelihood activities. Thus, this evaluation finds that the CCT distribution design (with two tranches) has allowed beneficiaries greater flexibility

and empowerment in responding to their needs.

The CCT also contributed to livelihood provisioning as indicated by use of the cash on food and non-food essential needs. Measured by change in income, the CCT intervention was also successful in livelihood protection for those that have regained their pre-Haiyan income or even increased it. Overall, the CCT intervention contributed to livelihood recovery of 68% of all CCT respondents (i.e. those 40% who

reported having same income plus those 28% who reported increased income). Still, almost one third of the beneficiaries (32%) reported that their incomes have decreased, compared to their incomes before Haiyan. Additionally, because the CCT beneficiaries were already poor before the typhoon (as this was one of the criteria for beneficiary selection), even those whose incomes have increased are still mostly economically vulnerable. Livelihood promotion, through alternative livelihood activities, could have improved economic resilience of the beneficiaries. However, the intervention was less successful in livelihood promotion, with only 34% of the survey respondents (who received either CCT only or both UCT&CCT) opting to engage in alternative livelihood sources. Thus, while the CCT effectively contributed to livelihood protection, it was less effective in livelihood promotion.

This evaluation finds that the community grant is an effective livelihood promotion intervention. It shows positive signs of contributing to coral reef and marine life recovery, and thus to sustainable livelihood for the surrounding communities.

In general, this evaluation finds that the FSL interventions were successful in facilitating access to food and livelihood for its target beneficiaries. The project met the targeted number of households for both CCT and community grant, while it exceeded the target for the UCT. Further, this evaluation finds that there is no significant difference in the proportion of beneficiaries who recovered their income status among those

who received only UCT, those who received only CCT, and those who received both UCT and CCT.

Effectiveness SHO 2-WASH:

SCI's latrine distribution has had direct benefits to families. Together with its hygiene promotion and Zero Open Defecation (ZOD) campaign, the WASH intervention has effectively helped not only at the household level but also the entire Municipality of Carles improve its sanitation situation. The magnitude of success of the WASH intervention is also due to the complementary efforts by the municipal and provincial government. Some of the communal water facilities have yet to be fully utilized because of seasonal water availability.

SCI's capacity:

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SHO 1 interventions were implemented under an emergency response team (i.e. SCI Estancia Haiyan Field Office), an ad hoc structure established by SCI in emergency situations such as Haiyan. SHO 2 implementation was undertaken in the context of structural and staff transition. The emergency structure was effective in providing quick and early response but it faced challenges in data recording and data management. The organizational transition and staff turn-over somehow affected the implementation of the SHO-funded program but it did not affect the achievement of targets. Overachievement in terms of number of FSL beneficiaries reached is indicative of high efficiency but it is also partly due to the conservative estimate of the amount of cash transfer coupled with a design factor wherein the beneficiary selection criteria favor expansion over concentration. Deviations from SHO 2 program plans such as omission of cash for work (debris clearing) and support for market traders is not an indication of lack of capacity but of flexibility on the part of SCI to adjust activities according to changing situation. Changes in the plan or major deviations/modifications from the proposal are in most cases a result of cluster agreements/recommendations; effort to find complementation in various grants; and SCI's ability to identify and respond to changing context and community needs.

Logistically there had been no major problems when it comes to the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. In terms of financial controls, SCI has established an effective financial control system especially with regard to cash transfer activities. The only control issue when it comes to cash transfer is the utilization of PhilPost as delivery mechanism since the way it happened has defeated its purpose. The biggest challenge of SCI lies in data recording and data management. There was also insufficiency in the nuancing of the needs assessment or context analysis which can be gleaned from the design and/or operationalization of some interventions.

Relevance:

All SHO interventions are found to be relevant in responding to the post-disaster needs of the affected communities. However, some interventions, like the WASH latrine distribution and ZODC, are more relevant in addressing pre-existing vulnerabilities and thus contribute strategically to better recovery and development. This is also true for some components of the education intervention, like the infrastructure development and capacity building for teachers. The FSL interventions are relevant. The need to resume livelihood to get food and cash for other needs, coupled with functioning markets, made cash transfer an ideal mechanism for distributing support. The unconditional cash transfer, in particular, was an ideal mechanism because it gives recipients a greater sense of dignity and choice over their own welfare. This is less so for the household CCT and community grant because of the design for these grants (i.e. putting conditions on how the grant is spent).

For SHO 1, the community's high dependence on fishing as a main source of income meant that the boat repair cash transfer was particularly responsive to the community's livelihood restoration needs. The SHO 2 CCT for household livelihood diversification was relevant to the emergency context and the local economic context of the beneficiaries because it aimed to address the pre-existing vulnerability of households that rely on a single source of income. To this end, it succeeded in promoting alternative livelihoods in 34% of the recipients of this grant (i.e. relevant albeit not very effective in fostering livelihood diversification).

In terms of livelihood recovery, 28% of the CCT recipients reported increased income. These households are now in a better position to generate necessary assets to generate income than the other groups. Those CCT-only recipients whose present incomes are the same as pre-Haiyan (40%) have recovered to their pre-existing economic vulnerability. Those whose current incomes are still below pre-Haiyan levels (32%) are the worst off among the three groups. For SHO 2, the community grant for artificial coral reef construction is relevant not just in addressing immediate problem of having much less fish for catching but also in restoring marine biodiversity.

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Efficiency (Budget Utilization and Management):

This evaluation finds that, in general, the budget utilization and management in SHO 1 and SHO 2 reflects the findings on effectiveness. That is, where resources were maximized, this translated into more effective components of the SHO intervention and organizational effectiveness, and vice versa. No evidence of unnecessary or unrelated expenditures was found in either SHO 1 or SHO 2. Further, the over- or underspending experienced in each component and in the project as a whole did not affect its ability to reach and even exceed its intended targets. The over- or underspending experienced is within the budget flexibility allowance of 10% and might be attributable to the use of a floating exchange rate to some extent.

There is underspending in some items within budget “chapters” that suggests that there is room for more efficient budget allocation to maximize implementation/program effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. This evaluation finds that underspending occurred mostly when some budgeted program activities were dropped because of changes in context, or because there were likely not enough beneficiaries found for that intervention (for CCT and UCT). Nevertheless, the underspending within program components (e.g. trainings, hygiene promotion, construction of wells, UCT, CCT) could be reduced to improve intervention quality so as to expect better effectiveness and relevance. Similarly, there is underspending for monitoring and evaluation within “Program Management Support” that could have been more efficiently utilized.

Sustainability:

In general, this evaluation finds that some elements of the whole SHO intervention are more sustainable than the others. Given that the intervention was short-term and undertaken when the communities and even the government (e.g. barangay, municipal) institutions were recovering from the disaster, any intervention will be taken as an external assistance rather than community-owned.

This evaluation finds evidence pointing to the sustainability of livelihood activities supported by the conditional cash transfers to households. For the boat repair CCT, the output of the intervention (i.e. repaired boats) can be used indefinitely to secure livelihood. For the UCT and CCT for alternative marine livelihood, some (3.64% of survey respondents) are reinvesting the cash transfers they received into the livelihoods they have set up, thus ensuring sustainability of these livelihoods. In terms of sustainability of the community grants in Carles, this evaluation finds that the results of the intervention can be sustained because of the legal and political support of the local government.

In terms of education, this evaluation study finds that all interventions in education are likely to be sustainable, except for interventions with consumable items (i.e. hygiene, school, and teacher kits). The school infrastructure and WASH facilities will be maintained by the schools from their annual budget. As for the psychosocial training and the teachers circle it is likely that the schools will sustain these. This is because disaster risk management is already a mandated responsibility of schools and part of it is the capacity to give psychosocial first aid or intervention. As for the teacher’s circles, the present workplace culture and DepEd structure lends itself to teachers continuing to work together and interact socially within the school and with other teachers from other schools.

The sustainability of WASH intervention in the communities depends on how the package of support (water-latrines-hygiene) works to make the ZOD program sustainable. Given the strong support of the municipal government to the program, it is likely that the ZOD communities will be sustainable.

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Sustainability is also anchored on the maintenance of the facilities constructed. This evaluation finds evidence that the barangay council can take an active role in helping maintain the facilities.

Coherence, Coverage and Participation:

This evaluation study confirms that the SHO-funded program was implemented in close coordination with UN and other international humanitarian agencies in the region via the cluster system. This evaluation study also finds that SCI's priorities and types of intervention are in line with cluster recommendations. As such, it has contributed, to a large extent, to the achievement of the goals of set forth by the international community and national government.

Coordination did not only happen among non-state institutions, but also between SCI and government institutions. Coordination with barangay officials (Barangay Council) is also observed in the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. SCI has also established partnership with the Department of Education and to a certain extent with the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Partnership with DepEd was not only institutionalized via a Memorandum of Agreement but it was also strong to the point that SCI is treated as a member of the DepEd community in the region.

In terms of coverage and participation, this evaluation finds that the SHO program has a wide geographic coverage and benefitted vulnerable people and institutions, as the discussion on effectiveness has shown. However, there are issues in participation and inclusion, notably in the FSL Cash Transfer intervention. Challenges in meaningful community participation generated issues of inclusion-exclusion. It is in the level of setting vulnerability criteria and in selecting the actual household beneficiaries vis-à-vis SCI criteria that issues of participation and exclusion became apparent. One issue concerns the community's own notion of vulnerability and target unit of assistance (i.e. family versus household) vis-à-vis SCI's vulnerability criteria. The other issue concerns exclusion of other vulnerable households vis-à-vis inclusion of households who do not fit the criteria. Another issue concerns the role of the Barangay Selection Committee vis-à-vis the role of the elected Barangay Officials. These have unintentionally created and/or aggravated social tension and friction among residents and between the residents and barangay officials or BSC, with no appropriate mitigating measures put in place.

Recommendations:

This evaluation study recommends that when the SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions are replicated in a similar situation, the following be considered:

- For all relief support packages (hygiene kits, student's kits, teacher's kits) provide uniform sets and aim for universal coverage when possible. When resources limit universal coverage, adhere to the SPHERE guideline which says, "If the general living conditions of an affected population were already significantly below the minimum standards before the disaster, agencies may have insufficient resources to meet the standards. In such situations, providing basic facilities for the entire affected population may be more important than reaching the minimum standards for only a proportion" (SPHERE Handbook, 2011).
- For FSL, continue providing cash transfers with sufficient flexibility in the use of the funds especially when there is a functioning market. There is a need to clarify and have a common understanding among the project staff on what the UCT and other cash transfers are meant to do. Consider avoiding conditions on how the cash transfers should be spent as this negates the purpose of providing flexibility.

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- In addition, ensure the amount given primarily to alleviate immediate hunger (food aid) is matched with the area's food basket cost for the average family size plus the inflationary effect of a disaster.
- Continue partnership with a third-party delivery mechanism for cash transfers to intended beneficiaries. Consider revising the operational process of transferring the cash to households (i.e. minimize instances of PhilPost staff distributing the money in person; explore other ways to deliver the cash). Consider utilizing money remittance centers or bank-based facilities (e.g. BPI Banko) or telecommunication-based facilities (e.g. Globe G-Cash).
- For boat repair support, consider including a skills training activity with accompanying distribution of tools (similar to training and tools provision for shelter construction under a different grant) especially if the amount of cash support is insufficient to complete the repair or construction.
 - In addition, consider differentiating support depending on the degree of destruction of the boat (i.e. higher amount for totally damaged than partially-damaged).
- When tying livelihood support to shelter repair or construction, provide sufficient capital to ensure enough income will come out of the livelihood intervention to be able to support house construction and/or repair. Otherwise, aim for a more realistic outcome.
- For education, continue providing disaster risk reduction trainings and other activities, in line with the Philippine government's National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. Consider providing the teachers of SHO-funded target schools with psycho-social first aid and DRR training.
- For WASH, continue zero open defecation initiative, and consider providing a standard amount of materials for each household across all barangays. Otherwise, when barangay council and community members are involved in decisions regarding allocations, strengthen buy-in strategies and implement such strategies across all target areas.
- For all interventions, improve on using a participatory framework and processes to take the communities' knowledge and perceived vulnerability into account.
- Strengthen coordination with other aid agencies down to the type of intervention vis-a-vis beneficiary list level to avoid duplication and unnecessary tension in the community.
- Cultivate more partnerships (as opposed to coordination) with relevant government agencies and local non-government organizations
- In a humanitarian assistance context, where aid agencies and resources are abundant, aim for multiple intervention in fewer areas to maximize results.
- Ensure timely, proper and thorough recording coupled with a more systematic data management even during emergency phase, in order to make data reconciliation (finance versus program) and reporting more efficient and less burdensome. Further, it could provide timely information to program staff and senior management for making critical decisions regarding program intervention, especially with regard to striking a balance between expansion (reach) and concentration (completeness).
- Continue streamlining data management within SCPPO. In particular, further strengthen the process of integration of MEAL in program development and implementation to ensure high standard of quality in implementation and improvement of institutional and staff capacity. That is, the MEAL produces commendable internal studies and monitoring reports. These knowledge products that MEAL produces should feed into how programs conduct the interventions (using analysis of data made by MEAL and recognizing recommendations).

In SCPPO's transition to recovery and development work, the following should be considered:

- For MEAL and programs, strengthen research skills and capacity.

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- For Finance, consider using an independent data source when reconciling figures with programs and MEAL.
- For Logistics, consider more staff exposure to target areas to have a better idea of the logistical requirements of the intervention.
- To ensure smooth transition from recovery to development, aim to finish untested infrastructure such as the communal water facilities and latrines. Also, revisit finished constructions to ensure these are still working within the life of the project.
- The projected poverty impact of typhoon Haiyan would certainly worsen the socio-economic condition of the already impoverished beneficiaries. Continue to aim for increased resilience by supporting livelihood and DRR management. When FSL program is to be implemented, conduct a political-economy study of the target areas as a basis for program design and operational plan.
- In considering FSL interventions for women, consider taking into account gender parity of labor. Providing women with economic empowerment (thru alternative livelihood) without transforming gender roles at home, would only add to women's burdens.
- Meaningful participation is in the heart of a successful and sustainable intervention. Ensure depth of participation as opposed to just consultation in all phases of project cycle.